Following the last week’s hot incident, when a Patrol ship of the Turkish Coast Guard intentionally managed to ram a Greek Patrol ship near IMIA islands, the possibility of armed conflict rises. During the collision, the OPV 90 Gaydos had suffered serious damage in the rear of its hull. This combined with the fact that the Turkish navy prohibited an Italian Offshore Drilling Ship belonging to ENI, to conduct research drills inside Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, raises a rather unfriendly situation between Greece and Turkey.
A possible armed event in the following months is highly anticipated. In this article we would try to simulate a possible Greek Armed Response to Turkey’s ambition to control the Aegean and Cyprus oil Reserves in Eastern Med.
There are two areas of Turkish interest. One Are is in the North and Central Aegean where previous studies and drills showed that there are moderate Sea oil and gas reserves. That area brought the two countries to the brink of a war in 1987 during the Seismic Incident. Greece since then have established only a few small oil drilling platforms south of Kavala (Prinos Area).
While Turkey could be engaged in oil exploration in Central Aegean especially near the Imbros and Tenedos Islands, the financial feasibility of such endeavour is not very promising. The last decade, the Holy Grail of Oil exploration is a vast area between Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Egypt. This area is located South of Cyprus and is threatened by the Turkish plans for offshore drilling even in Cyrpus EEZ. Turkey doesn’t recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus since the invasion of 1974 and the separation of the island. Therefore considers itself as a regulator for the Turk-Cypriot part of the island which was excluded from the talks.
Our goal in this article is to analyse the military aspects of this possible conflict. Two areas will be analysed, Northern Aegean and the Sea Area between Rhode Island and Cyprus.
To control this area and having in mind that there is no real threat from the limited Cypriot Navy, its main rival is the Greek counterpart. The best way to blockade Greek Navy’s response and is to isolate the area between the Rhode Island, Kastelorizo and Cyprus.
Except the various vessels that will be listed below, the proximity of the Dalaman Naval Airforce Base to that Area can contribute the Turkish Navy with constant presence of ASW air assets like the S-70 B Helicopters, CN-235 MPA and ATR 72 ASW Patrol aircraft. This could minimise the possible routes of the Greek submarines towards Cyprus.
A possible crisis could begin with the sinking of one of the Greek Patrol vessels (this almost happened the previous Sunday) in the Eastern Med Area along with the capture or prohibition of Sea Drilling Ships in Central Aegean and Eastern Med.
-What forces could be used to confront the vast Turkish navy?
-Can the turkish upgraded Perry Class Frigate still be considered a reliable AAW support vessel?
-Do Greek Armed forces have the right tools to prevail?
-How would the airforce’s QRA assets contribute in an air/naval scenario?
We will try to analyse a possible Alpha Strike initiated by the Greek forces against a numerically superior Turkish navy which has been deployed in the Central Aegean and Eastern Med (between Kastelorizo and Rhode Island). The codename of the combined TASMO/AsuW Operation would be Astrapi (Thunder)-2/18
Rival Forces
Greek Navy:
The main objectives of the Greek Armed forces would be :
- Restore Sea Control, Destruction of the Turkish Navy vessels in Central Aegean
- Restore Sea Control, Destruction of the Turkish Navy vessels in Eastern Med
- Neutralise Dalaman AFB and Turkish Navy’s air ASW assets
- Destroy Radar Installations in Western Turkey (Secondary Side mission)
The main Greek military assets used during this operation:
Greek Armed Forces |
|||||
Skyros AFB (Central Aegean) |
Near Psara Island |
Near Kafirea Strait/ Sporades |
Eastern Med |
Greek Army Lesvos Island and Agios Eustratios |
Greek Airforce Tanagra AFB/Souda Crete AFB |
SAM Patriot Battery |
FAC Combantante IIIb Class Kavaloudis (Harpoon) |
U 209 submarine (UGM Harpoon) |
FFG MEKO 200 HN Hydra (Harpoon) |
3xM270 MLRS (ATACMS) |
20x Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 (Scalp-EG) |
MM40 Coastal Battery SSM Exocet Blk I |
FAC Combantante IIIb Class Kavaloudis (Penguin Mk2) |
U 209 submarine (UGM Harpoon) |
FFG Kortenaer S Class (Harpoon,RIM 7 Sparrow) |
FFG Kortenaer S Class (Harpoon,RIM 7 Sparrow) |
12x Mirage 2000 EGM (AM-39 Exocet) |
FAC Combantante Class Laskos (MM40 Exocet Blk II) |
FFG Kortenaer S Class (Harpoon,RIM 7 Sparrow) |
FAC Super Vita (MM40 Exocet Blk III, RAM) |
FFG MEKO 200 HN Hydra (Harpoon) |
12x F-16 Block 52+ AAW/SEAD (Amraam/ HARM) |
|
1x P3B Maritime Patrol Aircraft |
FAC Super Vita (MM40 Exocet Blk II) |
1x EMB-145 AEW&C Aircraft, 4x Pegasos UAV |
Turkish Navy:
The main objectives of the Turkish Armed forces would be :
- Pursuit of any Sea Drilling Exploration ship in Central Aegean and near Rhode Island
- Naval Blockade on Kastelorizo Island
- Sea Control in both areas and also protecting turkish Sea Drilling platform ship in Eastern Med while conducting research exploration drilling inside disputed Exclusive Economic Zone (claimed by both Greece and Turkey), south of Kastelorizo
The main Turkish military assets used during this operation:
Turkish Armed Forces |
||||
SAG Central Aegean |
SAG South Eastern Med |
SAG South2 Eastern Med |
Dalaman AFB |
Turkish Airforce Konya, Dalaman, Balikesir,Cigli, Bandirma |
FFG MEKO 200 Track I (Harpoon, RIM-7) |
FFG MEKO 200 Track IIb (Harpoon, ESSM) |
FFG MEKO 200 Track I (Harpoon, RIM-7) |
2x Rapier SAM |
55 x F-16 CCIP AAW QRA(Amraam /HARM) |
FFG MEKO 200 Track IIb (Harpoon, ESSM) |
FFG MEKO 200 Track IIa (Harpoon, RIM-7) |
FFG MEKO 200 Track IIa (Harpoon, RIM-7) |
2x Altigan SAM (Stinger) |
|
2x FFG Perry Gabya Class (Harpoon, ESSM, SM-1) |
FFG Perry Gabya Class (Harpoon, ESSM, SM-1) |
FFG Perry Gabya Class (Harpoon, SM-1) |
4x Oerilkon 35mm AAA |
|
3x FAC FPB-57 Dogan Class (Harpoon) |
3xFFL A69 Corvette (L5 mod 4 torpedo) |
4x FAC Killic II (Harpoon), blockading Kastelorizo Island |
4x S-70B SeaHawk ASW Helicopter |
|
FFL Ada Class (Harpoon, RAM) |
FFL Ada Class (Harpoon, RAM) |
FFL A69 Corvette (L5 mod 4 torpedo) |
4x ATR-72 ASW |
|
FFL A69 Corvette (L5 mod 4 torpedo) |
3x CN-235 MPA |
The whole operation to meet the Goal of the Greek Forces can be separated in three phases. One neutralising the strategic importance Dalaman AFB, secondly eliminating the naval threat in Central Aegean and lastly opening a safe naval corridor between Cyprus and Greece in Eastern Med.
The Greek-Turkish theater in case of a possible war is mainly the Aegean and Cyprus Sea Area in addition to a relative small land area in Thrace called Evros Region. In land , the two countries are separated by a sizeable enough river (called Evros, Maritsa or Meriç river) which can be considered as a defensive barrier from both sides. The Aegean Archipelago consists of multiple Greek Islands along with a few Turkish ones. Cyprus also is around 550 km away from Crete Island. In this area Turkey (in addition to Central Aegean) wants to expand it’s Exclusive Economic Zone. No peaceful agreement has been reached between the two countries and this is the central point of any crisis.
To avoid full-scale war with Turkey, the Greek Armed Forces could hit swiftly with concentrated firepower against one of Turkey’s main pillars of projecting power in the region, the massive Turkish Navy. Neutralising or reducing to critical Turkish navy’s ability to conduct naval operations, safeguards the rest of the Greek forces in the Cyprus and Aegean Archipelago.
Key Aspects for accomplishment:
- Strike in short time with available assets, not fully mobilising to avoid general alarm
- Greek AEW&C operation mainly ELINT, only open the Erieye radar before the naval strike begins
- Considering the numerous QRA air assets of the rival Turkish airforce, the time that Greek strike aircraft are spotted should be minimised
- 8x F-16 CCIP from TuAF is patrolling the area around the Turkish naval forces. Neutralising them beforehand will benefit the AsuW mission
- A synchronised surprise attack in the three key objectives is a must
- One-shot execution, no recursive strike packages
Phase 0: Lights Out
The initial strike package includes 20 x Mirage 2000-5 Mk2, each armed with one SCALP-EG cruise missile along with 2xMica IR for self-defense. Typical strike radius of this setup is 450nm in HI-HI flight profile. Their primary target is the Dalaman AFB and the infliction of maximum damage in Turkish navy’s stationed ASW air assets.
In our case to avoid detection the Strike package will fly in a Low-Low profile from Tanagra AFB and use the Cluster of Cyclades islands as cover to avoid detection from the land-based Turkish Early Warning radars in Minor Asia. Due to the Earth’s curvature the Horizon of the Turkish radar’s in low flying targets is far less than the hundreds of kilometers which is the typical range against a fighter aircraft.
Targeting data for fixed targets in Dalaman AFB is provided by the MUSIS network of surveillance satellites (Greece has joined in this EU project with 2.5% of total cost).
1:18:59 – Contact MISSILE #123 has been lost.
1:18:59 – Contact MISSILE #124 has been lost.
1:18:59 – Pegasus II UAV has been destroyed!
1:18:59 – Contact MISSILE #125 has been lost.
1:18:59 – Weapon: AIM-120B AMRAAM #2406 is attacking Pegasus II UAV with a base PH of 90%. Final PH: 90%. Result: 82 – HIT
1:18:59 – Weapon: AIM-120B AMRAAM #2407 is attacking Pegasus II UAV with a base PH of 90%. Final PH: 90%. Result: 82 – HIT
1:18:59 – Weapon: AIM-120B AMRAAM #2408 is attacking Pegasus II UAV with a base PH of 90%. Final PH: 90%. Result: 7 – HIT
1:18:59 – New contact! Designated MISSILE #128 – Detected by Pegasus II UAV [Sensors: Generic FLIR] at 193deg – 23,2nm
1:18:55 – New contact! Designated MISSILE #127 – Detected by Pegasus II UAV [Sensors: Generic FLIR] at 143deg – 0,6nm – Small Contrail Detected
Various QRA F-16 CCIP aircraft from Konya, Balikesir, Cigli AFB are trying to take-off
1:21:27- Weapon: AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM P3I.3 #2422 has run out of energy… self-destructing
1:21:27 – Weapon: AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM P3I.3 #2425 has run out of energy… self-destructing
1:21:21 – Onyx #2 (F-16DM Blk 40 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]) has been destroyed!
1:21:21 – Flight 2314 has no units left; dissolving…
1:21:21 – Contact MISSILE #78 has been lost.
1:21:21 – Weapon: AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM P3I.3 #2430 is attacking Onyx #2 (F-16DM Blk 40 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]) with a base PH of 95%. PH adjusted for distance: 76%. Onyx #2 has nominal agility: 4,9, adjusted for altitude: 4,9. Agility adjusted for proficiency (Regular): 3,92. Aircraft has a weight fraction of 0,16 – Agility adjusted to 3,55. Agility adjusted for tail-on impact effect: 1,8. Final agility modifier: -18%. Final PH: 58%. Result: 30 – HIT
1:21:39 – Contact F-16DM Blk 50 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr] #75 has been lost.
1:21:39 – Weapon: AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM P3I.3 #2432 is attacking Kon #3 (F-16DM Blk 50 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]) with a base PH of 95%. PH adjusted for distance: 62%. Kon #3 has nominal agility: 4,9, adjusted for altitude: 4,9. Agility adjusted for proficiency (Regular): 3,92. Aircraft has a weight fraction of 0,14 – Agility adjusted to 3,59. Agility adjusted for tail-on impact effect: 1,8. Final agility modifier: -18%. Final PH: 44%. Result: 35 – HIT
Aftermath
The aftermath of the above operations are quite different for both navies (HN and TN)
Total losses on both sides are listed
Hellenic Armed Forces Losses:
1x FAC Super Vita
1x Kortenaer Upgraded S Class frigate
1x Meko 200HN Hydra Class
4x Pegasos UAV
Turkish Armed Forces Losses:
3x F-16DM Blk 50 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]
6x F-16DM Blk 40 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]
2x F-16DM Blk 50 Falcon [Peace Onyx III CCIP Upgr]
11x S-70B-28 Seahawk
3x A/C Hangar (4x Medium Aircraft)
2x CN-235MPA Persuader [Meltem II]
2x A/C Hangar (1x Very Large Aircraft)
4x ATR-72-ASW [Meltem III]
1x A/C Hangar (2x Large Aircraft)
8x A/C Hardened Aircraft Shelter (1x Medium Aircraft)
2x 35mm Twin Oerlikon [UAR-1021 Skyguard FCR]
1x Vehicle (UAR-1021 Skyguard)
1x Radar (TRS 22XX)
1x Radar (AN/FPS-88)
5x FFL F 500 Bozcaada [A 69] ASW corvette
1x FFG F 244 Barbaros [Meko 200TN Track IIA]
3x FFG F 495 Gediz Upgraded Perry [Perry, Gabya Class]
2x FFG F 240 Yavuz [Meko 200TN Track I]
2x FFL F 511 Heybeliada [Ada Class]
1x FAC P 340 Dogan [FPB-57]
2x FFG F 246 Salihreis [Meko 200TN Track IIB]
Some key notes about the Turkish Forces:
- Perry FFG upgraded ships has proven themselves as very capable limited AAW ship while using both ESSM and SM-1MR (44 of them used). In our scenario we took the worst case of those vessels being fully armed. Each one was armed with 32xESSMs (Mk 41 VLS) and 35xSM-1 MR (Mk13 launcher). This situation will change in the following decade due to the lack of technical support for the SM-1 missile. Still the ships would be quite efficient but with smaller AAW magazines. Smart-S mk2 radar even if not state of the art did the job of identifying incoming SSMs quite remarkably
- Salihreis Meko 200 Track IIb, armed with 32xESSMs, Scorpion Jammer and 2xStir FCR was a tough nut to crack. The sustaining of 1 hit and keep fighting distinguish it as the flagship of the Turkish Navy
- While fighting as Surface Attack Group in Central Aegean, the proximity of the Greek islands and the threats (Patriot SAM battery, Exocet Coastal Battery, Greek Navy ships at advantageous position behind islets) that they oppose may overcome Turkish Navy’s capability to withstand a multi-direction SSM massive salvo. A navy without air assets to provide early warning against low flying threats is quite vunerable
- The lack of Integraded Air Defenses in the Turkish sovereignty, proved devastating. The Rapier and Altigan (Stinger) SAM systems are ineffective against modern threats like cruise missiles. the Dalaman AFB was completely annihilated. Four of its ASW ATR-72 aircraft were destroyed along with 2xCN-235 MPA and 6xS-70 B Helicopters. Also another bunch of 3xF-16s were destroyed
- Turkish QRA fighters didnt manage to protect the Turkish fleet. Except Dalaman AFB the rest of them (Konya, Cigli) were located too far away from the South SAG naval forces in Eastern Med. From the point that the Greek Attack have been recognized till the time that enemy missiles reached the Turkish ships, the total time was 10-12 minutes
- Total losses for Turkish navy were quite heavy 5xFFG MEKO 200, 3xFFG Perry Advanced, 2x FFL Milgem Ada Class Corvette, 5xA69 FFL ASW corvette and 1 FAC Dogan. In addition the loss of 4xATR72 ASW aircraft along with 2 CN-235 MPA seriously reduced Turkish navy’s ability to control the Sea area between Cyprus and Crete.
Some key notes about the Greek Forces:
- The P-3B and EMB-145 Erireye (as Elint) proved extremely capable in identifying from a long distance the type of the Turkish vessels (FFG/FFL/FAC)
- Greek Mirage 2000 fighter armed with Exocets are extremely dangerous because they can wreak havoc in the soft spots of any turkish SAG Group (Milgem and the initial 2 hits on SAG South 2 Group Barbaros and A69 corvette). They can further help in saturation of Air Defenses so that the rest of the SSMs reach their targets
- A combined COMAO of HARM/Exocet capable aircraft may pose a serious threat. HARMs aren’t quite effective against well armed enemy naval forces and can be easily engaged. But they can be used as a decoy attack to provide more time for the SSM missiles of the main strike to come closer
- Greek navy’s lack of AAW ships (with big magazines of surface to air missiles) is making any attempt to control the Eastern Med a dangerous mission. In our scenario the small SAG Group was completely destroyed. A solution could be to arm those ships with longer range SSMs like the Exocet block 3 missile. Its range of 180+ km outmatches any Harpoon missile available in Turkish inventory.
- An upgrade program for the MEKO 200 HN frigates is more important than ever. Turkish navy’s current fleet of 16 frigates (8xPerry and 8x MEKO) along with 2xMilgem corvette class (2 more building) is better armed both in AAW roles and AsuW. To be the flagship of the Greek navy, MEKO 200HN needs to be upgraded to a limited AAW capable ship. An installation of an mk41 VLS (or use double canisters for the existing Mk48 launcher os that total missiles carried doubles) along with new radar and possible more STIR FCR (SARH guidance for the ESSM) could be a start
- Greek UAV Pegasos II did their job monitoring closely the Turkish ships. But as any UAV they are expendable
PS: We used the strategic air/naval simulator Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations . If anyone is interested in using the sandbox scenario described in the article please send us an email to defencegreeced@gmail.com
Για άλλη μια φορά κάνατε εξαιρετική δουλειά.
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Ευχαριστούμε πολύ Δημήτρη!!Θα συνεχίσουμε με την ίδια ποιότητα
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Great job!
In my point of view HN today lacks the capability of operating to Eastern Mediterranean due to the lack of AAW ships and air superiority fighters of 4-4,5th generation on behalf of HAF,in combination of the lack of air refueling capability for her air assets.Perhaps the capability of HN to operate to Eastern Mediterranean(or else from the area east of Dodekanisa and west of Cyprus) is limited to its submarine force.
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@KonTim
You are correct, if the Hellenic Navy wants to operate in the Eastern Med it needs to invest heavily on it’s AAW capabilities even in anti-missile level. A good start would also be the aqcuiring of air tankers that would enable Greek Falcon’s CAP missions to last longer thus indirectly helping the HN
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Εξαιρετική προσπάθεια και με την ευκαιρία, όλες οι εξομοιώσεις που έχω διαβάσει είναι επίσης εξαιρετικές.
Λίγες μικρές καλόπιστες παρατηρήσεις…
Από τα σενάρια απουσιάζει το επιχειρησιακό πλέον Β-737ES MESA, που θα επηρέαζε όλες τις φάσεις των σεναρίων και πιθανόν τα αποτελέσματα θα ήταν διαφορετικά…
Η Ανάγνωση του άρθρου (εξομοίωσης σεναρίων) αφήνει πολλά κενά, με το ποστάρισμα μόνο φωτογραφιών.
Η απουσία βιντεοκαταγραφής, θα έδινε στον αναγνώστη την κατανόηση και αντίληψη των επιμέρους καταστάσεων που εξελίσσονται και θα εμπλούτιζε την παρουσίαση με εκατοντάδες πληροφορίες.. Η προσπάθεια σας και φυσικά ο χρόνος που αφιερώνετε για την ολοκλήρωση τέτοιων σεναρίων, οπωσδήποτε σας κάνουν άριστους, πλην όμως λείπει η βιντεοκαταγραφή.
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So if I understood this simulation correctly, it only accounted for the first 30 minutes (or so) and limited the scenario to the eastern Aegean sea?
No Turkish AWACS were accounted for, no indigenous attack rockets, and way too few of their F-16’s.
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‘»Turkey currently has been developing the Hisar-A low altitude air defense system and HİSAR-O medium-range air defense system by ASELSAN and Roketsan since 2007. The Hisar-A will be completed by 2020, and the medium-range defense system’s prototype will be completed by 2021. Turkey’s ASELSAN has also completed the development of KORKUT, a self-propelled air defense gun system for effective ground-based air defense against air threats.’
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/feature/5/189652/defense-cooperation-at-center-of-erdo%C4%9Fan%2C-macron-meeting.html
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@Θοδωρη
Σε περιοδο ειρήνης τα ΑΣΕΠΕ δεν πετάνε 24/7. Οι Τουρκοι ακόμη και με την κρίση με το ΠΑΘ 90 ΓΑΥΔΟΣ παρόλο που είχαν 11 πλοία στην περιοχή δεν ειχαν σηκώσει αεροσκάφος ΑΣΕΠΕ Ε-747Τ Wedgetail. Επίσης το δικο μας ΑΣΕΠΕ χρησιμοποιηθηκε καθαρα σαν παθητική πλατφόρμα ELINT συλλεγοντας μονο πληροφορίες για τον τύπο και κατηγοριοποιηση των πλοίων απο τις εκπομπές ραντάρ τους. Το μονο εναεριο ρανταρ που έπαιζε ηταν των P-3
Η συνολικη επαφή κράτησε 30 λεπτα. Ο συνολικός χρόνος απο την στιγμή που ανιχνευσαν οι Τουρκοι τους πρώτους SCALP μεχρι και την στιγμή που επεσε ο τελευταιος Exocet/Haproon σε Τουρκικο πλοίο ήταν 12 λεπτα. Αυτος ήταν και ενας λόγος που τα αεροσκάφη που σηκώθηκαν απο την Konya AFB μολις είχαν φτάσει χωρις να προλαβουν να προστατέψουν τα Τουρκικα σκάφη νοτια του Καστελοριζου
Θα το εχουμε παντως στο μελλον ένα σεναριο με Wedgetail
Η συμπεριληψη επίσης βιντεο απο τις προσομοιωσεις ειναι μια πολυ καλη ιδεα για το μελλον (αν και απαιτει πολυ μεγαλυτερο χρονο, ισως να εχουμε μικροτερα αλλα περισσοτερα αρθρα τετοιυ ειδους στο μελλον)
Εξαλλου το ειχαμε κανει σε παλαιότερο άρθρο μας εδω
https://goo.gl/Z8R6gN Προσομοίωση: Βυθίζοντας την Tουρκική Φρεγάτα F 246 Salihreis
@rockwool
It wasnt a general Conflict scenario between Greece and Turkey but a possible Alpha-Strike including the element of surprise!
i) 8 Turkish F-16s were patrolling the area around the Turkish fleet . Keep in mind that to keep those number of aircraft 24/7, there is a 1/3 rule that stands for 1 flying 1 coming back and 1 on the ground rearming/refuelling. So 8 aircraft flying continuously stands for 24 aircraft in total.
Rest of the QRA aircraft in Eastern Med managed to fly from Konya AFB to South of Kastelorizo but it was too late. Keep in mind that they need around 2 minutes to take off and around 30seconds to 1 minute to give the order from the time that first Scalp was identified. A flight from Konya AFB to the area south of Kastelorizo needs around 190 nautical miles (380 km) or 10+ minutes (20-21 minutes+) which is greater than the 12 minutes that the last exocet hit the Barbaros TrackIIa Frigate
Problem was that the QRA aircraft of an airforce covers around 20-30% of its total aircraft. Keep in mind that TuAF has a historic low of 0.9 pilots per aircraft due to Erdogan’s prosecutions against suspects for the Coup. Also the 2 QRA aircraft fighter that took off from Dalaman AFB was engaged by the patrolling F-16 Falcons
In Central Aegean the Patriot SAM battery doesn’t leave you with much choices. The QRA (Quick Reaction Aircraft) might include some HARM armed F-16s but they need more than a few fighters to take down a PAC-3 Battery
ii)Hi-SAR will be completed by 2020 but nobody knows its true anti-missile capabilities especially against an advanced Cruise missile like SCALP-EG (in reality the flight altitude of the SCALP might be less than the 300 ft used in the CMANO )
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Οπωσδήποτε τα επιχειρησιακά – αντικειμενικά δεδομένα κάθε εξομοίωσης, καθώς και το στοιχείο του αιφνιδιασμού σε αυτήν την επιχείρηση δικαιολογούν απόλυτα την απάντηση σας.
Για το δεύτερο σκέλος, είναι ευπρόσδεκτη η «υπόσχεση σας» για προσάρτηση βίντεο σε μελλοντικά άρθρα εξομοίωσης και ένας ακόμη λόγος επιπλέον που σας παροτρύνω να το κάνετε είναι ότι η ανάγνωση του άρθρου, καθώς και η μελέτη του, απαίτησαν πολλές ώρες από πλευράς μου, δεδομένου ότι έπρεπε να τρέξω επιμέρους σενάρια μόνος μου για να κατανοήσω και να αντιληφθώ τις πληροφορίες και τα δεδομένα που τα στηρίξατε. Αντίθετα με τα βίντεο αναρτημένα είναι αυτονόητο ότι η μελέτη, η κατανόηση και η αντίληψη του σεναρίου περνά σε άλλη διάσταση όπως πχ στο σενάριο που μου προτείνατε να διαβάσω (το είχα ήδη κάνει!). Φυσικά ο χρόνος είναι ποσαπλάσιος, αλλά εσάς δεν σας φοβάμαι!!
Φίλος για πάντα
Θοδωρής
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@ DefenceGreece
Thanks, that was a lot of information I did not know or think of. As for the Hisar-A and Hisar-O, that was just an article I just found and thought you might be interested in (but you probably knew of those projects already).
A bit OT, but Sweden is looking to replace its Hawk AAA with PAC-3. Athens seriously should consider offering its batteries to them and buying used S-300’s with upgraded electronics (if Moscow is replacing theirs and S-400’s are too expensive). One S-400 placed on eastern Crete will protect Cyprus a lot better.
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Hi rockwool
Turkish Industry is making big steps towards autonomy and offering medium to high qualiry products. But they have a long way for complex systems like Medium/High-Sam. That is why they bought 4 xS-400 batteries along with an agreement for tranfer technology for MEADS. The naked Turkish Air Defenses will be transformed in the following 5 year to a multi layer IADS. Korkut SPAAG might probably prove itself(low-medium complexity) and produce in large numbers. At first they will be used bybthe Turkish army to accompany motorised brigades. At second stage they will be used by the Airforce and even the navy!
https://www.google.gr/amp/s/turkishnavy.net/2016/12/29/a-prototype-of-a-turkish-air-defence-gun-system-is-aground-on-a-greek-island/amp/
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»The latest F-16 Block 52+ of the Peace Xenia III order, proved quite effective both outmatching F-16 CCIP fighters due to a better engine and also performing SEAD with its HARM and ASPIS II EW (Jammer and RWR)» Πολύ δυνατη απαντηση σε αρθρο γνωστου ιστοτοπου με θεματα κυριως για την μικρα ασια………………
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@rockwool. Replacing the Patriot AAM with S-300 would be a grave mistake, one that the HAF is not likely to make. The System is battle-proven, well known to the personnel of the HAF and is being regularly updated with new software that enhances its Anti-missile capacity. Most important, it can be easily integrated with other western arms systems, such as AWACS, radars, ships and what-not, which is not the case for the S-300. Selling the S-300 to buy additional Patriot batteries makes a lot more sense.
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Τώρα, το Ελληνικό Ναυτικό και Αεροπορία δύναται, ΣΗΜΕΡΑ, να πάνε οπού δει στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο για χαρη του γεωτρύπανου, αν δεχθούμε ότι είχαν πρόσκληση από την ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ, έχουν την δύναμη και την εμπειρία για δράση σε αυτά τα νερά και αέρα, το ναυτικό μας άλλωστε είναι πλέον ναυτικό ωκεάνιας δράσης και οι σύμμαχοι το δέχονται ως τέτοιο, δύο ΜΕΚΟ 200ΗΝ, που μετά την αλλαγή από RΙΜ-7Μ σε ESSM, εξασφάλισαν στις κυψέλες του VLS τους παραπάνω αναχωρηγία, αφού ο ESSM είναι μικρότερης περιφέρειας – αναδιπλωμένα πτερύγια του RIM-7Μ, θα δρούσαν αποτελεσματικά σαν »ανορθόδοξο» πλοίο AAW, μαζί με δύο SSK τύπου 214ΗΝ, που θα έκαναν χρήση του εξαίρετου CMS που διαθέτουν, έστω με τις παλαιές, αλλά αξιόπιστες SST-4/SUT, δηλ. τορπίλες κατά επιφανείας και ανθυποβρυχιακού πολέμου και την συνοδεία 2 ΤΠΚ Super Vita, εξαιρετικές σε ανοικτή θάλασσα, με βλήματα μακράς ακτίνας κατά εδάφους και θάλασσας, όπως τα Exocet blk2/3, το έχει πει και ο κύριος αρχηγός του ΓΕΕΘΑ και τις έχω δει από κοντά, ίσως και δύο εκσυγχρονισμένες φρεγάτες »S», με διόλου ευκαταφρόνητη δύναμη πυρός ακόμα και σήμερα, θα ήταν πρέπουσα απάντηση και ο Τούρκος απλά θα κοιτούσε, βάζω μέσα σε αυτά και ανθυποβρυχιακή υποστήριξη, ειδικά οι »S» φέρουν έως και 2 AB-212ASW αλλά πλέον και S-70, μαζί και ένα σμήνος μαχητικών blk52+/ADV και Μirage 2000-5Mk2 (AIM-120/Mica) με δεξαμενές CFT/μεγάλες απορριπτόμενες τα πρώτα, μεγάλες απορριπτόμενες τα δεύτερα, αρκούσαν από Ρόδο/Κρητη έως βάση »Ανδρέα Παπανδρέου» και αντίθετα για CAP.
Όλα αυτά, με την βοήθεια τακτικής εικόνας από δυο ΑΣΕΠΕ τύπου EMB-145H, ίσως και από Vigilant του Λ.Σ. σαν αεροσκάφη MPA.
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Defence, θαρρω ότι ο ΜΚ-48 των ελληνικων ΜΕΚΟ, εχει παραπανω των 16 ESSM σε κανιστρα των 2 βληματων, δηλ. 32.
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Το ευχομαι αν και να πω την αλήθεια πέρα από την αρχική παραγγελία για 70 ESSM καμία άλλη δεν έγινε έξτρα οπότε τα 16 επιπλέον βλήματα πιθανόν θα είναι RIM-7 ++++P . Τα διπλα κανιστρα ονομάζονται DP-48
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καταπληκτικο αρθρο ….. επειδη διαβαζω αρκετα αρθρα στο ιντερνετ μας δειχνει οτι δεν ειμαστε ακομα πεθαμενοι και υπαρχει ακομα δυναμικη , εστω και αν ο εξομοιωτης δεν λαμβανει υποψιν του πολλες παραμετρους . οποτε με λιγα πραγματα η διατηρηση της αποτροπης και του σημαντικου πληγματος θα υπαρχει . υ.γ το ποσο δυνατο χαρτι ειναι οι scalp eg και οι εξοσετ να το δουν οσοι θελουν αμεση αποσυρση των μιραζ και αντικατασταση τους απο αλλο πυρομαχικο . υ.γ2 το ποσο καλος ειναι ο συνδυασμος των φ16 μ2000 παλι φαινεται στο σεναριο . υ.γ3 το ποσο κακο μας κανει η μη αναβαθμιση των μ2000 σε -5 παλι φαινεται . απο την στιγμη που δεν μπορουμε να σηκωσουμε για εναερια μαχη μ2000-5 και τα βαζουμε ολα στην στρατηγικη κρουση . υ.γ4 το ποσο διαφορα θα μας δωσει η εκδοση V των φ16 φαινεται οπως επισης οτι χρειαζομαστε στον ιδιο βαθμο αγορα περισσοτερων πυρομαχικων . υ.γ4 το ποσο σημαντικο ειναι να αναβαθμισουμε σημαντικα τις μεκο φαινεται οπως και η αγορα νεων τορπιλων για τα υποβρυχια φαινεται ξεκαθαρα
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καλησπέρα! Θα μεταφραστεί κάποια στιγμή το άρθρο στα Ελληνικά;
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Δυστυχώς στο άμεσο διάστημα δεν υπάρχει χρόνος για κάτι τέτοιο
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Συμπέρασματα από την προσομοίωση:
α)Α. Μεσόγειος και πλοία με καλές AAW ικανότητες είναι μονόδρομος.
β)Η αναβάθμιση των mirage είναι σημαντική όχι τόσο για το αρχιπέλαγος αλλά για την Α. Μεσόγειο
γ)Παραδόξως, το σενάριο δείχνει πως όσο περιορισμένη μπορεί να είναι η αποτελεσματικότητα των ανθυποβρυχιακών πλοίων για το Αιγαίο, άλλο τόσο σημαντική μπορεί να είναι για την Α. Μεσόγειο όπου ως ομάδα με ΑΑW πλοία, μπορούν αποτελέσουν μια σημαντική δύναμη
δ)Για άλλη μια φορά, αποδεικνύεται η αξία της alpha strike και δυστυχως δεν εννοούν να το καταλαβουν οι πολιτικοί μας.
Ξέρεις τι θα είχε ενδιαφέρον; Αν θα μπορούσαμε να βρούμε κι άλλες χρήσεις για τα Ρ3 μέσω προσομοιώσεων, να βάζεις σενάρια όπου τα P3 μπορεί να είναι χρήσιμα και να βρίσκεις τι δίνει η προσομοίωση. Ο λόγος που το ζητώ είναι γιατι τα Ρ3 σε 1η φάση δε φαίνεται να είναι η πιο…ενδεδειγμένη απόδοση αυτή τη στιγμή και παρολα αυτα το ΠΝ εμμένει στην αποφαση του. ‘Ισως ανακαλυψουμε εκ του πλαγιου τους λογους αυτους με αυη τη ιδιοτυπη… trial and error μεθοδολογια.
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«…A solution could be to arm those ships with longer range SSMs like the Exocet block 3 missile. Its range of 180+ km outmatches any Harpoon missile available in Turkish inventory….»
A better option could be to upgrade existing Harpoon SSMs with II+ ER kits as Finland recently procured & approved, with even better range & profile than Exocets Block III.
The same applies with existing gliding JSOW C upgrade to JSOW-ER with 300 nautical miles (500km) range & video link/heat sensing guidance system, at an affordable upgrade price $350K per unit.
U214 were not engaged?
Excellent job, eventhough I strongly believe that current doctrine applied, there is no possibility that Greek Froces strike first, unless TAF sinks a Greek Asset.
In such a case there won’t be any surprise
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Hi ivychris
The upgrade of the Harpoon missiles is a valid option but HN has a much older version of RGM-84C .The Finland’s RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Grade B is the version that will be upgraded. Note that in any case the ER version has a much lighter warhead 140 kg < 165 Exocet<225 of the existing Harpoon
The operation of the subs wasnt simulated . The reason is pretty simple. Total time was half an hour. Submarine operations need many hours
Of course a follow up submarine attack would sweep any leftovers
Also I dont believe that USA would approve a 500km upgrade kit for the JSOW. It would be great but they are a little reluctant to give us strategic weapons considering previous denial on AGM-130/SM-2/JASSM
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Block 1C has been designated AGM-84D with increased range quoted to be 220 km (120 nm) by using JP-10 instead of JP-6.
-The terminal attack mode of the xGM-84D is either pop-up or sea-skimming, and
– has also improved ECCM capabilities…
…Block II was never acquired bz US Navy & was developed for export only as AGM-84L, with designation AGM-84J allocated to Block II conversions… based on the AGM-84D…, which can now be further upgraded to Block II+ ER…»
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Hi ivychris
Your proposal seems very promising and feasible
It would be great to have a total Aegean AsuW coverage anytime !
It is also only half of the cost of new missiles
We should inform Hellenic Navy’s Fleet Command…
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@ Kostas Zangogiannis
I’m aware of the ability of the Patriots to be integrated with other western arms systems, and so is the Turkish generals and obviously they find the non-integration of the S-400’s to be worth it. Secondly, just like Russia has integrated all of Syria’s various old AAA with all radars, as well as with the Russia’s radars in Lattakia, a set of used upgrades S-300’s could equally be integrated.
The performance of Patriots have proven US propaganda to be a lot (but not exclusively) hot air. Their radius is way smaller than the S-300 and if PAC-3 held the operational quality the world has been force fed since Gulf War I (1991) then nobody would want the S-400’s: Qataris, S.Arabians, Indians!!!, Turkey, and Israel wouldn’t bother building its own competitor.
On top of being far inferior to the S-400 the PAC-3 costs quite a lot more, never mind compared to upgraded used Russian S-300’s. The latter could perhaps also be ordered with a set of the longest range (400km?) missiles from the S-400 and then Crete can seriously give some better protection to the eastern Aegean and Cyprus too.
Keep in mind the cost of more PAC-3’s which finally makes them perfumed gold sprayed turds, and that integration with NATO systems is less interesting for Russia is not Greece’s enemy but Turkey.
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…and Iraq:
* http://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/02/23/553353/US-Iraq-S400-Russia-missiles-
No doubt, the next five years will show a lot of countries switching from NATO to Russian weapons, and even more so for every five years.
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Επειδη εχει αναφερθει και αλλου μπορω με σιγουρια να πω πως να μεν οι ΜΕΚΟ μπορουν να φερουν 2 ESSM σε καθε κανιστρο, ΟΜΩΣ με την παρουσα διαταξη (φαλανξ πανω απο το hagar) υπαρχει σοβαρος περιορισμος στο βαρος που μπορει να αντεξει το υποστεγο. Δηλαδη οι 10 τονοι του φαλανξ ουσιαστικα μειωνουν στο μισο των φορτο βληματων που μπορει να φερει η πλατφορμα. Οποτε 2 λυσεις υπαρχουν: Ξηλωμα το ΠΜ φαλανξ και διπλασιασμος του φορτου ή αναμονη μεχρι να ερθουν οι ESSM (ή καποιος αλλος πυραυλος) που δεν θα χρειαζεται STIR, στην θεση του οποιου θα μπορουσαμε να βαλουμε καποιο CIWS.
Φιλε dg, υπαρχει ενα προτυπο προσομοιωσης που χρησιμοποιει ΟΛΟ το ΝΑΤΟ και λεγεται JTLS.
Κατα καιρους λαμβανουν χωρα ασκησεις (υπο την αιγιδα του ΓΕΕΘΑ) με διαφορα σεναρια πολεμου Ε-Τ. Πραγματικα αν μπορουσες να μαθεις τα αποτελεσματα στα περισσοτερα θα εμενες εκπληκτος….
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Γεια σου SZEF
Οντως το επιπλέον βαρός των νεων κανιστρων DP-48 και των +16 πυραυλων δεν ειναι αμελητεο
i)Θα μπορουσαν να υπάρξουν επιπλέον μηχανισμοι ενισχυσης στηριξης στο υποστεγο?
Η χωρική διάταξη επιτρεπει κάτι τέτοιο?
Στο άμεσο μέλλον (2020+) βγαινει η έκδοση του ESSM Block2 με ενεργο ερευνητη ραντάρ
Πιθανον οι υπάρχοντες πύραυλοι επίσης να είναι αναβαθμίσιμοι οποτε θα είχε πολυ ενδιαφέρον
Βεβαια η θεση του Δευτερου Stir που είναι πάνω απο τις καμινάδες του πλοίου δεν ξερω κατα πόσο ενδεικνυται για εγκατάσταση RAM
ii)Θα ηθελα να ηξερα ποσους ESSM έχει τελικα προμηθευτει η Τουρκια γιατι οι πηγες μου ειναι συγκεχυμενες. Πιστευω πως ολα τα κελια των MEKO και Perry δεν ειναι γεματα με quad packed ESSM
iii)JTLS ε? Θα είχε ενδιαφερον να ξέραμε τα αποτελεσματα ειδικα σε αεροναυτικα σεναρια
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Για το JTLS Εχω ο ιδιος εικονα των αποτελεσματων:-) .Στη θεση του δευτερου Στιρ σκεφτομουν κατι σε μιλλενιουμ ισως. Δομικα δεν μπορει να γινει αλλη παρεμβαση. Υπαρχει κι αλλη λυση για αυξηση του αποθεματος.Βλεπε κλαση TRIBAL των καναδων πριν και μετα
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Χαίρομαι ευχάριστα
Ναι το Millenium είναι εξαιρετικό, καλύτερο από το Phalanx και με μεγαλύτερη εμβέλεια, χωρίς να είναι ιδιαίτερα ακριβό.
Για την κλάση Tribal (Iroquouis) εννοείς την αφαίρεση του πυροβόλου και τοποθέτηση μπροστά του εκτοξευτή VLS ?
Επανατοποθέτηση πίσω ενός πυροβόλου 76mm(?)
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@rockwool. The purchase of the S-400 for Turkey doesn’t seem to be a decision of the Generals based on operational reasons, but a decision of Erdogan based on political reasons. So, no, the non-integration of the system in the NATO communications and IFF is not so easily to be shrugged at. As a matter of fact, it is vital. All the countries you mentioned are not NATO members. For the latter, the purchase of such an important weapons system from Russia is not acceptable by the USA and will have dire consequences-as Turkey is probably about to find out.
The Patriot missiles have seen action in battle, the S-300 and S-400 have not and the amazing capabilities they claim have yet to be tested-besides, no one can assure us that the export countries will receive full-capacity systems and not downgraded «export editions». It has happened before with Iraqi tanks.
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@ Kostas Zangogiannis
The S-300 and S-400 might not be battle proven but what is battle proven is pretty much everything else in the Russian inventory (over 200 weapons systems by now). For sure Russian radars are proven and Syria’s recently upgraded AAA make that clear, taking out Israeli stand-off weapons with the Pantsir-S and an upgraded S-200 took out an F-16I – their perceived «god».
* https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-it-s-not-an-f-16-it-s-god-1.5825864
Another thing that battle proven are Russian electronic warfare systems – obviously ^^. In GD’s article «Simulating the Tomahawk missile attack on Shayrat AFB in Syria» I’ve linked to two of the best articles I’ve found on this topic. The AC mounted Khibiny has not only proven itself superior to USS Donald Cook and the hyped AEGIS system, but also the Krasukha-4 in Syria shut down Incirlik:
* https://www.fort-russ.com/2017/08/breaking-us-navy-orders-halt-to-all.html
* http://www.voltairenet.org/article189043.html
In the above mentioned GD article I also link to Houti drones taking out one PAC-3.
…Battle proven does not mean they’ve proven good, but Hollywood fixed that…and that’s what I meant about Israel funded and built an alternative to PAC-3: no point in fixing what does not SUC-3.
Dr. Keshe of Iran has created a similar EW system to the Russians and the Iranians have landed (!) several types of US drones without damaging them, and reverse engineered them, including the ScanEagle and the RQ-170 Sentinel:
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uo_5Xhu9jtE
* http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930821001137
My point is, there is a dramatic power shift occurring in the world concerning technology and the Greeks are behind the Turks in realizing this, for the latter have proven themselves quite innovative (and not only industrious). Do you want to get ahead, or lose your islands and natural gas to Turkey?
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Οχι. Αφαιρεση του 5′ απο την πλωρη, τοποθετηση εκτοξευτων μκ-41 (λογικα εως τρεις χωρανε), αφαιρεση του ΠΡ φαλανξ και τοποθετηση στην θεση του οτο-μελαρα SR με καλυμμα LO και βεβαια πυρομαχικα βουλκανο. Το φαλανξ του υποστεγου και ο μκ-48 μενουν εως εχουν.
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Πολύ ενδιαφέρον…Strales+Vulcano φαίνεται πολλά υποσχόμενο και διατηρείται η ικανότητα πυρων του ναυτικου πυροβολου
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Ακομα και με διατηρηση του 5αριου ως κυριου οπλισμου αν αφαιρεθει το φαλανξ της πλωρης ο χωρος που προκυπτει χωραει ενα module mk-41 για επιπλεον 16 ΕΣΣΜ.
Οπως βλεπεις υπαρχουν αρκετες λυσεις, το θεμα ειναι να εχεις αρκετα $$$ για να γεμιζεις κελια…
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DefenceGreece should perhaps simulate a scenario with Greece using the Bastion mobile coastal missile defense system, as a means to creatively look at crises in the Northern Aegean and the Sea Area between Rhode Island and Cyprus?
Specifications:
Warhead 250 kg semi-armour piercing HE
Operational range:
350 km against sea targets
450 km against ground targets
Flight ceiling 14,000 m
Speed Mach 2.5
Guidance system: active-passive radar seeker head
Launch platform: coastal installations
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K-300P_Bastion-P
Since the HAF has shrunk a lot and increasing squadrons is not a viable option and the Navy having a similar situation one should ask if not a set of Bastion systems could provide the most effectiveness to an interesting cost. A similar system was battle proven by Hezbollah in 2006 when they fired at an IDF Saar-5 hitting its helicopter, homing in on its hot exhaust fumes. Recently after the F-16Impotence was downed Lieberman announced the production and creation of a strategic missile force consisting of two types, of 150km and 300km range respectively. It’s an old idea of Lieberman (costing $2 billion) that have been opted out since the IAF has had godlike status in Israel despite costing a lot more to execute the same mission.
* https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5096287,00.html
Placing Bastion on Crete and Cyprus, yet another on Lemnos, and one on (say) on Tinos, and a fifth on Rhodes, wouldn’t that relieve the HAF for a lot of missions that it exclusively can do, Scalping, CAS-ing somewhere, and protecting Cyprus?
Wouldn’t it cover the distance between Crete and Cyprus most effectively and cost wise?
The Argentinians «Exoceting» the British in the Falklands proved the danger of cheap missiles, and the Soviets used asymmetric warfare to counter NATO air forces. Same goes for the Iranian doctrine, and Hezbollah’s asymmetrical warfare is battle proven – with excellence. 😉
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@rockwool. You seem to be very keen on russian weapon systems. The purchase of such systems is a political impossibility for Greece. Forget it. It won’t happen. Ever. Again.
Greece does have coastal missile defence systems, 2 Exocet MM40 batteries in unknown locations on the Aegean Sea. If we ever need better missiles the US is testing its brand new Sea-ATACMS missile, which is my dream weapon (500 kilos warhead, ballistic trajectory and ca. 3 Mach speed, range of 300 kms). You can seal the Aegean Sea and the Ionian Sea from the Greek mainland with this baby. And it is cheaper than the Russian.
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My keenness lies in Greece’s survival in the now, and in the future, after decades of being raped by bankers and whom ever have thought of themselves as her pimp.
Conventional thinking is what is reproducing this situation and hence unconventional thinking is what will save the Greeks. Mind you, Greeks are know world wide for being thinkers, not for being monoliths. Thinkers submit themselves to Logos, monoliths to what ever is perceived as an authority by their small mindedness.
Greece must rise of its knees and kill its pimps what ever it takes. And if you would, you would perhaps start viewing your own older mindset as having been the one that is keen towards a certain country and not I. I gave you an example from the past week where Iraq – of all mothers forced in to prostitutes – rose up to Washington and its recent threats towards countries considering buying weapons from others. The world is changing. Political reality is something that one creates by allowing themselves to have another point of view than one who sees impossibilities, and thus limits himself and all dependent upon him. The former is an actor on the stage of life while the latter is a defeatist, by effect, even if not intently. Defeatism is not what one would think of as a Greek character but the decades leading to 2018 tell of another story. Most humbly said, get up and smack yourself because fire and hammer is what makes a sword.
As for the protection of the eastern Aegean from the Turkish Navy and the competition to Sea-ATACMS «on sale», one should not neglect the Indian Brahmos II:
Operational range: 450–600 km (280–370 mi)
Speed: Mach 7 (8,575 km/h; 5,328 mph; 2,382.0 m/s)
Launch platform: Ship, submarine, aircraft and land-based mobile launchers.
New Delhi and Tel Aviv being old good friends, and now that Athens has caught the kosheroiditi, New Delhi might think of selling?
The Chinese know-how is growing exponentially by the month. For instance, they were planning on buying the 117S of the SU-35 for their J-20 as well as naval Sukhoi’s, but instead they will soon field their own WS-15 reliable (!) hi-output engines (BTW the J-31 might be of interest to Greece in 5-10 years?). The Chinese probably now sell some successor to the C-802 with which the Houtis have sunk several Saudi ships (7 IIRC).
* http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2127796/china-talks-sale-jet-engine-technology-germany
* http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2053741/china-powers-military-jet-engine-tech-wean-itself-russian-imports
* http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1913442/chinas-military-closing-technology-gap-us-forces-says
* http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134680/chinese-military-drone-display-united-arab-emirates
‘Western superiority in military technology is “eroding”’, says International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London.
* http://www.scmp.com/tech/science-research/article/1911461/china-and-russia-rise-west-losing-its-edge-military-tech-says
The Iranians are some of the worlds most innovative among drones, EW and missiles, and have evolved far from the C-802. Their various systems are probably very cost effective, definitively in need by Greece, and since so then actors will act, put leverage and influence, and do anything needed to get ahead, for monoliths will not.
Brazilian stuff, South African, who cares, start thinking of solutions that are the most affordable as long as they are not Ukrainan – and there Athens has its excuse: «sórri, gouí kannót affórd Gouásinkton». 😉
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Μην κάνετε διάλογο με πλασιέδες, χάνετε το χρόνο σας (του αναγνωρίζω πάντως πως έχει λέγειν).
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@rockwool
Well it is a very good idea to see how can Bastion coastal defence help cyprus against a moderate Turkish naval Surface Attack Group (Phalanx would have a pretty hard time)
@SZEF
Αμα εμπαινε ενας 8αρης Mk41 θα είχαμε αλλα 32 κελια για ESSM ή 16 ESSM και 4 ανθυποβρυχιακους πυραυλους ASROC (η εμβελεια του ειναι σημαντική)
Εχεις πολυ ωραιες ιδεες….ελπιζω να γινουν πραγματικοτητα
Τα χρήματα αν και σεβαστα δεν μου φαινονται οτι ειναι τόσα ωστε να ειναι απαγορευτικο.
@Larisaios
I dont trust the Americans to approve an Attacms naval missile procurement
Neither I trust the Russians
The easieste way is to upgrade existing MM40 Exocet Coastal batteries with Exocet Blk 3
Of course if we manage to aqcuire the Atacms Naval….Aegean and Cyprus would be protected from naval blockades
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@ DG
Juxtaposing NATO systems side-by-side (because a phenomenon is what it is not) with equivalents of other producers is perhaps the best way DG can influence the discourse in Greece.
I found an article people here will find most interesting concerning the Iranian and Russian EW technology that has a 30 year leap ahead of USA:
* https://www.veteranstoday.com/2015/08/10/disclosure-why-sabotaging-the-iran-agreement-takes-down-america/
«Our models tend to reflect that Turkey will see a complete monetary collapse during the 2021/2022 period.»
* https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/international-news/turkey/turkey-default-or-war/
Is Turkey’s economic despair known in Greece (I had no idea)?
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Συγχαρητήρια για τη δουλειά σας! Πολύ ενδιαφέρουσα!
Θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει ένα πολύτιμο εργαλείο για την εύρεση βέλτιστων τακτικών.
Γενική παρατήρηση που προκύπτει από την προσομοίωσή σας: αυτός που θα χτυπήσει πρώτος, έχει ένα σοβαρό πλεονέκτημα…
Θα ήθελα να παρατηρήσω ότι για τη μέγιστη εμβέλεια των πυραύλων Exocet, κατά την άφεση το φέρον Α/Φ θα πρέπει να έχει μεγάλο ύψος και ταχύτητα. Επομένως, λίγο πριν την άφεση, τα Μ2000 θα πρέπει να κερδίσουν κάποιο ύψος, πράγμα το οποίο λογικά θα οδηγήσει στην αποκάλυψή τους απο τα εχθρικά ραντάρ. Κάτι ανάλογο συμβαίνει και με τα -5 και την άφεση των Scalp αλλά και με τους HARM. Ίσως το έχετε λάβει ήδη υπόψη, απλά δεν μπόρεσα να το επιβεβαιώσω.
Επίσης, η άμεση βύθιση φρεγάτας με 2 Exocet είναι σχετικά δύσκολο, αλλά όχι αδύνατο.
Σε επόμενο επεισόδιο, βάλτε και μερικούς MICA στο παιχνίδι 😉
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Ευχαριστω για τα καλα σας λογια το εκτιμω
Σε καθε περιπτωση κατά την εκτοξευση τα αεροσκάφη ανέπτυξαν ταχυτητα
Αμα προσεξετε σε μερικες εικονες στα δεξια (απο την Ελληνική μερια) έγιναν αφέσεις όπλων τόσο HARM όσο και Exocet σε χαμηλά/μεσαια υψη αλλά (10000+, 26000 ποδια) αλλα οχι σε ελαχιστα. Οσον αφορα τους SCALP έγινε άφεση από τα 300 πόδια. Στο CMANO με μεγιστη ακτινα δράσης τα 390 χλμ οποτε η εκοξευση απο χαμηλο ύψος (300 ποδια) μπορει να περιορισε καπως την εμβελεια αλλα ηταν αρκετη ώστε να φτάσει στην Dalaman AFB 195 χλμ μακρια. Τωρα αν στην πραγματικοτητα αυτες οι τιμες ειναι μεγαλυτερες ή μικροτερες δεν το ξέρω. 🙂
Σε καθε περιπτωση για τους HARM/Exocet το πεδιο είχε ήδη καθαρίσει στον αέρα από τα Ελληνικά F-16 blk52+. Οποτε και για λιγα δευτερολεπτα που ανιχνευτηκαν στο τέλος μετά απο pop-up δεν αλλαξε κατι καθώς και παλι βρισκονταν εκτος βεληνεκους των Τουρκικων ESSM/SM-1/RIM-7.
Οντως το στοιχειο του αιφνιδιασμου ειναι καθοριστικο. Οσον αφορα μελλοντικες αναρτήσεις ναι οι Mica ειναι ηδη στα πλανα μας!!!
Επίσης θα προσπαθήσουμε να τα εμπλουτισουμε με μικρής διάρκειας βιντεάκια
ΥΓ Ακομη και αν το πληγμα δυο πυραυλων SSM Harpoon/Exocet σε ένα πλοιο μεγέθους φρεγάτας δεν τη βυθίσει, η ζημια και η φωτια που θα απλωθει στο πλοίο το θέτει εκτός μάχης. Σε πολλα σημεια τα πλοία (ιδιαίτερα οι Ελληνικες φρεγατες ΜΕΚΟ και S που καταστράφηκαν) τεθηκαν εκτος μάχης (το σημειο με τον κυκλο και το Χ). Για απλούστευση βγαινει και το Status Sinking ωστε ο προσομοιωτης να το εχει εκτος (ισως bugακι που θα μπορουσε να αλλαξει σε non-operational)
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NO WAR for nobody but erdogan; hundred years since granmoter came from turkey .. where they lived thousands of years, the greeks in Anatoli..Lets Have Peace Everyone:)
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@wilda
Nobody wants war, but in case that war is inevitable you need to be in advantageous position
@SZEF
http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=4448503
Φαινεται πως το CMANO βρήκε το δρόμο του και επισημα στις τάξεις της Αμερικανικής Αεροποριας, Ναυτικού και Πεζοναυτων (Command Proffesional Edition)
http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=4448503
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i thinking..which was the flow of scenario,if or 8 or 12 turkish f-16 was in same area of south east turkish naval force in a high atitude (with help of fuel air- tanker) waiting for any air threat..Thaks for the article and simulation.there was the possability,those turkish aircraft block the M-2000 befora lunch the exocets.
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Then in that case you would have to send more Greek OCA (Offensive Counter Air) aircraft. Keep in mind that the Mirage 2000-5 mk2 after they dropped their payload (SCALP), they had enough fuel (at least to reach launching point) and 2 MICA to further assist in BVR combat. Same stands for the 4xF-16 in SEAD role, they still had two AMRAAMs each. There is a empirical 1/3 rule in Air Ops that means if you want to have a presence 24/7 in an area of interest you have to count 1 aircraft flying, 1 returning to base and one arming/refuelling. Meaning that for 8 aircraft in the air, you need to bind 16 more aircraft. And for 12 aircraft that counts to a 36+12 (Central Aegean)=48 total amount (!). If the Turkish airforce has a general availability of 80% this means that they have 184 out of 235 airworthy. Then 48 aircraft represents 26% of the turkish airworthy F-16 fleet. Of course after a few days the total amount of general availability will be reduced due to fatigue from the air operations (from 3-4 sorties per day per aircraft this would be reduced to only two or one per day) . So would you risk it?
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I recently saw an interview with the chief of USAF and she said that they in the past two-three years have raised the flight hours for F-16 pilots from +14 to +16/week, while they are aiming for +17h/week. I’m finding out there are a lot more factors than just the number of aircraft available on paper..
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το επομενο σεναριο σας θα πρεπει να εχει στην εξισωση και τις 2 fremm πλεον
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Πώς θα σας φαινόταν η αποστολή 2 Fremm+2 Super Vita+1 Meko+2 S προς Κύπρο?
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βαλε και 2 υποβρυχια συνοδεια defencegreece … υ.γ 32αστερ15 – 32σκαλπ ή 32αστερ30 – 2 ραμ – 16 essm – 32nssm -4 phalanx και αντιστοιχα 32 mm40block3 24harpoon ;;; ελα μωρε τωρα……
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@defencegreece. Βάλε και 2 ζεύγη F-16V από το Καστέλι σε ρολο προστασίας στόλου με τον ελεγκτή εναέριας κυκλοφορίας να παίρνει εικόνα από το Hercules των FREMM.
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ακυρα ολα … ως εχουμε παμε
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Δεδομενου ότι τα F-16V υπογραφηκαν, αναμενουμε τις FREMM. Ειτε γίνει ή οχι με τις FREMM η προσομοιωση θα ανεβει 😉
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